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Debnarayan Sarker 
 
The objectives of this article are to assess linkages and impact of participatory 
JFM Programme on Sustainable Rural Livelihoods (SRL) across socio-
economic group of forest fringe communities. The study is based four sample 
FPCs – one female FPC and three joint FPCs - under Midnapore and 
Bankura districts in West Bengal. The results from this study suggest that the 
JFM Programme under the sample FPCs/Villages in West Bengal is 
participatory. With regard to the SRL framework, strong sustainability criteria 
meet for very poor and poor households, which live below poverty line and 
are dependent on forest resource for their livelihood security. The study 
suggests that force or law cannot effectively control illegal collection of TFPs 
for the households living below poverty line, until a considerable increase in 
the collection of legal forest products – NTFPs, fuelwood etc. – and wage 
income from forest provide for their minimum livelihood security. 
 
Introduction 
 
In order to protect natural forests from further degradation owing to mere 
commercial exploitation of forest resources, participatory programme in forest 
management is fundamentally a decentralized grassroots movement initiated by 
forest communities. Decentralized community participation between the state 
and local communities has been globally accepted as a concept and essential tool 
for the sustainability of natural resources. In keeping with this, a consensus has 
also emerged in both academic and policy-making bodies about the desirability 
of decentralized participatory model for the management of forest resources. 
Concerning decentralized planning and participatory programme in JFM (Joint 
Forest Management), it is said that forestry can play a significant role for the 
well being of the people living in and around the forest areas and, conversely, 
these people can play a major part in making the forests around them more 
productive under local management partnership between the state and local 
communities. The World Bank Learning Group on Participatory Development 
defined participation as process through which stakeholders‟ influence and share 
control over development initiatives, and the decisions and resources that affect 
them (World Bank, 1995:3). The new policy lays emphasis on meeting the local 
needs in particular of the tribal and the rural poor living near the forest and in 
safeguarding their traditional rights and concessions subject to the carrying 
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capacity of the forests. To pave the way for this programme, the concept of 
participatory forest management programme closely tied with sustainable 
livelihood (SL) framework of forest fringe communities is increasingly being 
accepted as a viable tool of decentralized participatory forest management 
programme because the SL framework emphasizes livelihood assets, or capital, 
as the basis for the sustainable improvement of people‟s livelihoods without 
undermining the forest resource base. SL framework refers to „a livelihood 
comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) 
and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it 
can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its 
capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the 
natural resource base‟ (Carney, 1998:4, cited in Reddy et al. 2004:299). The 
participatory programme of forest management with SL framework has been 
treated as the best alternative among the multiple criteria of forestry programme 
because it seems to serve the two main pillars of sustainability – equity and 
efficiency/productivity: this programme is entitled to the livelihood sustenance 
issue of the forest fringe communities by giving them the right on timber forest 
products and non-timber forest products on forest resources on the one hand, the 
need for plantation and afforestation concentrated on ecological sustainability 
has been given emphasis on the other. 
 In most of the developing countries during the last one and a half decade, 
there has been a shift from revenue oriented forest management to conservation 
and that is related to participatory community based approaches (Bhattacharya, 
2001: 107). The main trends of the forest policies in the developing countries 
include replacement of uncontrolled exploitation, selected areas with 
conservation of forest, more plantations and community and social forestry, 
sharing of benefits with the forest dependent communities, involving 
communities and the management of forests, and encouraging communities to 
participate to some extent in decision-making (ibid: 107). However, some 
countries such as Thailand, Nepal and India recognize effective participation by 
local people in the forest consistent with government policies. 
 In India, evidence of earliest forest management by the state is found in 
Kautilya‟s Arthashastra (BC 321) which refers to „forests‟ being managed as 
„state reserves for revenue‟ and for „public use‟ (Sarmah and Rai, 2000: 209). 
But, indeed, no rulers in India did execute these policies in the management of 
forest resources before 1988. Rather, the forest policy of India before the year 
1988 was oriented with commercial need either of the government or of the 
rulers of India without safeguarding the traditional rights and concessions of the 
forest fringe communities on forestland. Although the first Act of forestry in 
India was enacted in 1865, the major laws governing forestry have formulated by 
the Indian Forest Act of 1878, Indian Forest Act of 1927 and the Forest 
Conservation Act of 1980 (World Bank, 2006: xvi). The Forest Conservation Act 
of 1878 and that of 1927 emphasized commercial timber production. The Forest 
Conservation Act of 1980 and the 1988 National Forest Policy shifted the 
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pendulum strongly towards forest conservation and joint forest management 
(ibid: 16-18). The revision of the National Forest Policy in 1988 marks a major 
departure from the earlier policies which emphasize on production of commercial 
wood and disregard for local need (Poffenberger, 1995; Sarmah and Rai, 2000: 
213), because Government of India, then, could understand that until and unless 
the benefit of forest fringe communities is secured, neither forest resources nor 
forest management can be sustainable. 
 However, against the custodian forest management system (commercial 
need either of the government or of the rulers of India), in keeping with the other 
parts of India, the local forest fringe communities of West Bengal have also 
mobilized repeatedly from long past to protect their traditional right on forestland 
(Poffenberger, 1995). With regard to the south West Bengal(Midnapore, 
Bankura, Purulia, Burdwan and Birbhum), including our study area, is 
concerned, Santal, Bhumij and Mahato tribal, with some low cast Hindus, 
mobilized repeatedly against Mughal and British rulers to protect their traditional 
rights on forestland from long past. Chur Rebellion (from 1767 to 1805), Naik 
Revolt (1806-16), Hul Rebellion (1855) are the glaring examples of the history in 
south West Bengal where forest fringe communities organized resistance against 
rulers of India to protect their own right in forestland. It is said that during Hul 
Rebellion (on July 16, 1855) some ten thousand tribal, under the messianic 
leadership of four Santal brothers stood their ground firmly and fought with 
bows and a kind of battle-axe in a battle near Pirpaiti (Dutta, 1940: 26). The 
revolt collapsed eventually after half their members were reportedly killed. 
Despite their defeat, the Hul Rebellion (as it is known among the Santal) 
profoundly influenced the ideological development of many Santal communities 
(Duyker, 1987: 35), and lives on in the songs and oral traditions of the tribal 
people of this area. 
 The JFM movement gathered momentum in West Bengal when in 1989 a 
programme of resuscitation and reestablishment of moribund sal and other 
hardwood forests in the districts of Midnapore, Bankura, Purulia, Burdwan and 
Birbhum in south West Bengal was initiated by the government with the active 
participation and involvement of the local people. Simultaneously, a Government 
resolution was also issued in 1989 declaring the principles of sharing of duties, 
responsibilities as well as the usufructs from the forests, with the participant local 
people living in the fringe of the forests. West Bengal Government‟ JFM 
resolution in June 1989 for the first time specifies the rights of the protecting 
communities with the help of establishing Forest Protection Committees/Village 
Forest Committees over forest lands through their active participation in the 
protection and development of forest lands. The foundation of an innovative 
forest protection system and the participatory forest management was thus laid 
for the forests of south West Bengal which cover approximately 38 per cent of 
the total forest area of the State. While mentioning the success of JFM 
programme in West Bengal, State Forest Report (2000) clearly mentions: “As a 
result of participatory and joint forest management activities in south West 
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Bengal the vast tract of scattered, over-exploited and degraded forests containing 
mainly the sal were resuscitated and restored to productivity with great 
improvement in quality and density” (SFR, 2000: 47). These participatory 
activities are now progressing in other areas of the state as well. 
 In this perspective, the main objectives of this article are to assess the 
linkages and impact of participatory initiative of JFM Programme on Sustainable 
Rural Livelihoods (SRL) across socio-economic group of forest fringe 
communities in four sample FPCs (Forest Protection Committees) – one female 
FPC and three joint FPCs - under Midnapore and Bankura districts in the state of 
West Bengal of India. This empirical study is important in that it might help us 
examine whether, unlike earlier forest policies which emphasize on production of 
commercial wood and disregard for local need, the 1988 Forest Policy of India 
and West Bengal has been effective in meeting the local needs in particular of the 
tribal and the poor living near the forests and in safeguarding their traditional 
right and concession subject to the carrying capacity of forests. The article is 
organised as follows: Introduction is followed by the conceptual framework and 
approach (Section 2). The data set, the profile of the sample villages and an 
analysis of the impact of the JFM programme on rural households in terms of 
five capital assets based on findings of this study appear in Section 3. Policy 
model appears in Section IV. The conclusions are contained in the final section 
(Section IV). 
 
Conceptual Framework and Approach 
 
Participation is a dynamic process through which stakeholders influence and 
share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources that 
affect their livelihood (Banki, 1981, World Bank, 1996). The Sustainable Rural 
Livelihoods (SLR) model looks at the basic dynamics of livelihoods and people 
draw on a set of capital assets as a basis for their livelihoods. Davies (1996) 
presents a detailed understanding of the dynamics of the livelihoods of the poor 
in relation to food, because they respond to highly viable conditions (natural and 
human) that confront them. Davies‟ conceptual framework is based on five key 
ideas – livelihood systems and security, Entitlement, Vulnerability, Resilience 
and sensitivity, Livelihood system diversity – which can be expanded to broader 
issues of sustainable livelihoods, depending on the different ways people acquire 
access to food (p.15). SRL framework of JFM programme allows us examine 
and assess the impact from many angles when compared to the earlier 
approaches to assessing costs (expenditure per unit etc.) and benefits (income to 
landed and employment to landless) not in a wider sense (Reddy, 2000; Rao, 
2000; Farrington et al., 1999). But SRL framework indicates the sustainability of 
the programme in the long run, which is not possible in the earlier approaches 
(Reddy and Soussan, 2004:331). Without following the traditional methods of 
employment generation and target group programmes, SL framework provides 
new ways to address poverty issues which are examined in relation to five capital 
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assets – physical, financial, natural, human and social. The understanding of 
these concepts can be gained by looking at them in relation to entitlement theory 
(Sen, 1982, 1985 cited in Reddy et al., 2004:299-300). The livelihood assets, 
with their perspective, can be seen as a capability or a potential that can be 
deployed to undertaking or „invested‟ livelihood activities. They are not uniform 
in character; but they influence the viability of livelihood activities.  
 Although five capital assets are assumed complementary to each other, 
especially, natural capital has a pivotal role in the livelihoods of rural people: 
predominantly the poor in the world depend directly on natural resources though 
cultivation, herding, collecting or hunting for their livelihoods. Therefore, the 
natural resources must be sustained for the livelihoods to be sustained (Rennie 
and Singh, 1996:16; Reddy et al, 2004:300). SLR can be termed as strong SLR – 
improvement in all the five capitals and less dependence on other activities – and 
weak SLR – improvement in some of the capitals and high dependency on other 
activities (for example, activities that are highly related to transitory or casual 
income). But improvement on each of these capitals is in turn dependent on 
various indicators. 
 The following indicators of capital assets are used for SRL framework in the 
present context. Physical capital is measured in terms of households‟ possession 
of durable assets (excluding land) such as house, machinery, livestock, and so on. 
Forest related structures reflect the physical capital (for example, non-timber 
forest product based production enterprises) created at the household and village 
level under the JFM programme. Increases in natural capital are measured in 
terms of changes in access to or improvement in land, water, and other common 
pool resources, (CPRs) - for example, use of fodder from CPRs and time spent in 
fetching it from forest is taken as a measure of improvement in CPRs. Natural 
capital is essentially a flow – the availability of productive potentials as inputs 
into livelihood activities that appears from the dynamics of ecosystem 
functioning (Reddy et al, 2004:201). Education, health and skills are the main 
elements of human capital. As regards direct measurement of human capital is 
concerned, changes in education and medical expenditure can capture variation 
within households/communities. Social capital is „the institutions, relationships, 
attitudes, and values that governs interactions among people and contribute to 
economic and social development‟ (World Bank, 2002:2). Social capital is 
represented by collective action, institutional strength, equity, information, 
education, economic status and demographic characteristics (Krishna and 
Uphoff,1999 ; Reddy et al., 2004 ; World Bank, 2002). These measures are ones 
that can be more easily asserted and more, pertinently, linked directly to JFM as 
a part of the process (such as decision made by all in JFM, women‟s participation 
in decision making) or as a factor that JFM seeks to influence (such as equity in 
benefit flows). All the indicators of social capital that have direct influence on 
JFM can be assessed and the changes of these have a long-term nature. It also 
helps in assessing the nature of participation of the people in the JFM 
Programme. Financial capital is measured in terms of savings (that part of cash 
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income that is not used for consumption) and/or social payments. Improvements 
to financial capital are usually assessed in terms of sustainable increase in 
income potentials, given the difficulties in obtaining accurate information on 
savings (something that people are understandably reluctant to talk about). 
 Improvement in all the five capitals could be termed „strong SRL 
(Sustainable Rural Livelihood), while improvement in some of the capitals that at 
least compensate for any decline in other capitals could be termed weak SRL 
(Reddy et al., 2004:300). As mentioned earlier, although these five capitals are 
complementary to one another, natural capital, especially, has a pivotal role in 
the livelihoods of rural people. Improvements in each of these capitals are in turn 
dependent on various indicators. The following functional form expresses these 
linkages: 
 SRL=f( PC, NC, SC, HC, FC, Yoth) 
Where SRL=Sustainable Rural Livelihoods; PC=Change in physical capital; 
NC=Change in natural capital; HC=Change in human capital; FC=Change in 
financial capital; Yoth=Change in income from other activities. 
 SRL is defined as strong if change of each type of capital is greater than 
zero (i.e., PC>O, NC>O, SC>O, HC>O, FC>O) and the change of income 
from other sources is less than or equal to zero (Yoth O), SRL is defined as 
weak SRL if ( PC+ NC+ SC+ HC+ FC)>O and Yoth>O. 
 This study considers the following factors affecting five types of capital 
related to forest resource. 
 PC = f(A) 
 NC = f(CPR) 
 SC = f(Ca, Ins, Eq, Oth.) 
 HC= f(H,Ed) 
 FC = f(S) 
 Physical capital (PC) depends on various assets (A) of household possession 
such as house, machinery, livestock and so on. Our study considers non-timber 
forest product (NTFP) based production enterprises‟ assets of households that 
mainly depend on forest for their livelihood (L). Natural capital related to JFM 
programme under our study is measured in terms of changes in access to or 
improvements in forest as common pool resources (CPR). The improved quality 
and quantity of common lands is reflected in the availability of fodder (f) 
fuelwood (Fu), NTFPs (Non timber Forest Products), TFPs (Timber Forest 
Products). So, CPR depends on f, Fu, NTFPs and TFPs. Social capital is 
dependent on collective action (Ca), Institutional strength (Ins), Equity (Eq) and 
Others (Oth.). Oth. includes number of sources of information, education, 
economic status and demographic characteristics. Human capital is related to 
Health (H) and educational expenditures of households (Ed). Improvements of 
financial capital are a function of saving (S). But because of the difficulties in 
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obtaining accurate information on saving for the reluctance of the members of 
households to talk about it, improvement of financial capital are assessed in 
terms of sustainable increase of income (Y) of households (Ibid: 301). Then, S 
depends on Y. All these activities are expected to play the key roles for 
sustainable rural livelihoods (SRL) through participatory initiative of JFM 
Programme. 
 The major problems in measuring these indicators are the level of 
measurement (household/village/community/group), types of statistical 
information (variable/attribute), difficulties in ascribing the changes to a 
particular programme (like JFM Programme) from other variables (Programmes) 
influencing these changes, unit of measurement (for example 
kilograms/days/standard cattle). To some extent, these problems or limitations 
can be dealt with through the adoption of appropriate techniques of data 
generation and estimation procedures. An appropriate baseline survey of the 
households would contribute to capture the changes better. But such baseline 
data set are often not available; the problem in such cases is that we cannot 
observe the participating households without observing the programme at the 
same time. This is the major loophole of this study. One way of handling this 
problem is to have a control group, which is similar to the participating group in 
all respects except the programme in order that the control group may act as the 
counter factual of the participating group. But it is difficult to find such a 
matching group because there is hardly any forest area, which is functioning 
without JFM programme in the area we surveyed. Even the recent JFM 
programmes that are operating in this area originated before the year 2002. In 
this regard a second best solution is reflexive comparison where „before‟ and 
„after‟ scenarios are compared for the participating households. This would be 
helpful to provide reasonable estimates of the impact on the condition that there 
is no serious memory lapse problem among the respondents (Ravallion, 2001). 
But memory lapse is directly related to the time, which passes away after 
initiating the programme. By using the „double difference‟ method where 
„before‟ and „after‟ situations are examined for both control and participating 
groups, these biases can be further minimized. Due to non-availability of data of 
matching control group for the causes mentioned earlier, we had to depend on 
„reflexive comparison‟ where „before‟ and „after‟ situations are examined for 
participating groups only. „Before‟ and „after‟ estimation is analysed for all 
households involved in the JFM programme under our study. Indicators are 
measured in actual monetary terms and presented as after and before situations. It 
is relevant to mention that no households of forest fringe communities were 
outside the JFM committee we studied and the share of timber sell received by 
each JFM committee from the forest department was equally distributed among 
all households irrespective of the economic status of households.  
 Although the aggregation of five capitals is a great challenge to us for two 
different periods - before JFM and after JFM, because the units of measurement 
are different for different types of capital and also for intra-capital assets, 
 8 
however, the aggregation is made in monetary units (in Rs.) for both the periods. 
Market price is taken into consideration for measurement for forest products, 
which is used for consumption by the FPC (Forest Protection Committee) 
member households; collector‟s price is taken into account for forest products, 
which is used for marketing by them. The expenditures related to health and 
education was available from households in monetary units (in Rs.). But with 
regard to social capital is concerned, the direct monetary value of social capital 
was not taken into account, because as social capital is an attribute of an 
individual in a social context, it is difficult in the measurement (Solow, 2000: 7; 
Sobel, 2002:139). Although social capital contributes to economic and social 
development (World Bank, 2002: 2), these attributes come into being by the 
nature of participation, type of participation and the process of participation of 
the local communities in the management of natural resources and common 
activities by the forest fringe communities and depends, mainly, on the growth of 
other capital assets
1
. But Reddy and Soussan (2004) and Reddy et al.(2004) 
measures social capital in terms of changes in income from migratory labour, 
while they attempt to assess five capital assets of watershed development 
programmes on rural livelihood in their studies. In spite of some limitations for 
measuring social capital we, however, follow Reddy and Soussan (2004) and 
Reddy et al. (2004) in view of measuring social capital on rural livelihood in our 
studies. 
 
The Data Set  
 
In order to examine our stated objectives based on both female and joint FPCs, 
we mainly depend on field survey in Midnapore and Bankura districts of West 
Bengal. The inclusion of Midnapore district under our field survey is due to the 
fact that the key precursor to JFM in India from the managerial perspective was a 
local level initiative, which was started from the Arabari hills under Midnapore 
district of West Bengal during the early 1970s. Moreover, as we attempt to 
examine the stated objectives in both the female and joint FPCs, some female 
FPCs are also in operation along with joint FPCs in Midnapore district. The main 
argument behind the inclusion of Bankura district under our study may be judged 
by the fact that female FPCs were first established in Bankura districts in West 
Bengal during early 1990‟s and the majority of female FPCs are now running in 
Bankura district. As per the official records (State Forest Report, Government of 
West Bengal 2000), 17 female FPCs are in operation in Bankura district – 4 in 
Bankura North, 9 in Bankura South and 4 in Panchet forest divisions (Sarker and 
Das, 2002:4410). However, during the first year of my UGC Minor Research 
Project entitled “How to execute the Joint Forest Management Programme with 
Sustainability? a study of Joint FPC and Female FPC in four divisions under 
Midnapore and Bankura districts in West Bengal” (Sarker, 2007), we conducted 
our field survey in four FPCs based on stratified random sampling method from 
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different forest ranges under two forest divisions – one in West Midnapore 
(Midnapore district) and the other in North Bankura (Bankura district).  
 We selected our sample (four FPCs) based on stratified random sampling 
method in the following lines. First, forest divisions and then forest ranges- the 
subdivision of population into several parts, called “strata”- were selected by 
purposive sampling method. Two forest divisions – one in the West Mednapore 
(Mednapore district) and the other in North Bankura (Bankura District)- are 
selected by purposive method. Next, within these two forest divisions(West 
Mednapore and North Bankura), two forest ranges – Gidni range and Hatibari 
range- were purposively selected from West Mednapore divisions, and one forest 
range – Gangajalghati range- is purposively selected from North Bankura 
division. As regards the justification of the purposive selection of specific forest 
divisions and then forest ranges within forest divisions related to the subdivision 
of the population into several parts (called “strata”) is concerned, the specific 
forest divisions and forest ranges were considered because those places are the 
regions of the research during the first year of the UGC project proposal on the 
basis of which the project was granted by UGC. 
 Second, the selection of sub-samples (four sample FPCs) within each 
selected “strata”- three forest ranges (Gangajalghati,Gidni and Hatibari) - 
depends purely on chance (Simple Random Sampling without Replacement). As 
regards Gangajalghati forest range under North Bankura forest division is 
concerned, one joint FPC was randomly selected from all existing total joint 
FPCs (fifty six in number). Female FPC could not be selected from this range 
because there was no female FPC within this range. Similarly, two FPCs- one 
female FPC and one joint FPC- were randomly selected from the respective total 
FPCs of the Gidini Range under West Midnapore district- one joint FPC 
(Khatgeria) was selected from total joint FPCs of the said range, and one female 
FPC was randomly selected from total female FPCs of the said range. 
Worthwhile to mention that two Female FPCs were in operation in Gidini Range 
under West Midnapore district – Kherajhore Female FPC and Depudanga Female 
FPC. Kherajhore Female FPC was randomly selected from them for our field 
study. Likewise, one joint FPC was randomly selected from Hatibari Range 
under West Midnapore division from total joint FPCs of the said range; but 
female FPC could not be selected from this range because there was no female 
FPC within this range.  
 Third, after selecting four sample FPCs under stratified random sampling 
method, all units of households of four sample FPCs are considered for our field 
survey. Total number of households under Kherajhore female FPC, Khatgeria 
joint FPC, Goulbermarshal joint FPC and Amjuri joint FPC are 32, 17,59 and 26 
respectively. Combining all households together, the total households considered 
for our field survey are 134 in number. But this paper is prepared based on the 
data collected only from head of all households (134 in number) under study. 
 The period of field survey was between February and October 2005. The 
reference period for the „before‟ and „after‟ situation is in the following lines. 
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The reference period for „after‟ JFM situation was the same with that of the field 
survey (i.e., between February and October 2005). But the reference period for 
before JFM situation related to each FPC was not the same. As the reference 
period of study related to before situation for each FPC is considered for the 
preceding one-year period from the starting of JFM programme in the respective 
FPC,this period was different for different FPCs, because the starting of JFM 
programme in all FPCs are different. JFM programme in Kherajhore, Khatgeria, 
goulbermarshal and Amjuri was started on March 1994, August 1995, May 1994 
and July 1995 respectively. Therefore, the reference period of before JFM 
situation for Kherajhore female FPC was between March 1993 and February 
1994;Khatgeria joint FPC, between August 1994 and July 1995; Goulbermarshal 
joint FPC, between May 1993 and April 1994; Amjuri joint FPC, between July 
1994 and June 1995. 
 Although this survey attempts to explore information from 647 members 
belonging to 134 households spread over 4 sample villages, this paper has been 
prepared based on the data collected from heads of each household only. Hence 
the number of respondents are134 belonging to 134 households spread over 4 
sample villages under study.. 
 This study, however, has some limitations. In addition to collecting data for 
before JFM situation by the recollection method (mentioned earlier), the size of 
sample of this study is small, if not so small. There are instances that the 
inferences drawn from considerable number of papers is based on little number 
of households with a little number of distribution for wealth categories (Singh 
et.al, 2002; Jayasankar and Muraleedharan, 2000; Banik, 1994; Sharma 
et.al,1995;Rajasekharan and Krishnamoorthy, 1999)
3
in relation to the relevant 
research work. Even, in the context of relevant work of Reddy et.al (2004) 
related to sustainable rural livelihood framework of participatory watershed 
development in India, while supporting the validity of the conclusion, the 
number of very poor categories was taken to 50 only. In this perspective, it seems 
to be relevant to mention that combining all villages together almost all 
households (127 out of 134) belong to very poor and poor categories. It means 
that almost all households live in a poor economic condition. Out of 127 
households, 86 are very poor and the rest (41) are poor. Hence, the conclusions 
drawn on the findings of this paper and the statistical validity of the conclusions 
based on the considerable homogeneous households belonging to lower 
economic status does not fail, not unexpectedly, to satisfy the robustness of the 
inference of this research work.  
 Each FPC was formed in the respective village; so the FPC/village is 
synonymous in this study. More importantly, although data were collected from 
two types of FPCs – female and joint, this study seeks to examine its objectives 
according to category of households as per land status and name of village/FPC, 
irrespective of female and joint FPCs.  
 In order to study the different aspects of the stated objectives simple tabular 
analysis, which presents absolute numerical values, percentage change, simple 
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proportion, is used in this research work. Real earning (in Rs.) is determined after 
deflating the money income by Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Labourer 
(CPIAL)
4
. This paper also examines as to whether there is any significant 
difference between two mean-values – (i) mean-values of two populations 
(female member of household and male member of household) for a given 
variable, say collected quantity of NTFPs, and (ii) mean values of two variables 
(after JFM situation and before JFM situation) for a given population, say 
household related to collected quantity of NTFPs (Goon et al., 1985:309-10; 
Gupta, 1992:1222-28).  
 All the indicators of social capital are qualitatively ranked by the response 
description against each indicator given on a four-point scale following either by 
Sinha and Sour (2006)[ very high (4), high (3), medium (2) and low (1), or 
always (4), most of times (3), sometimes (2) and rare (1)] or by Reidenbach and 
Robin (1990)[ high (4), moderate (3), low (2) and 
unfair/unacceptable/undesirable (1)] Higher score of the indicators indicates 
higher intensity of participation. The description related to the structure of 
participation used in this study appears in appendix 1. 
 This study considers simple technique of measurement like arithmetic mean, 
proportions, paired t test for equality of two means for examining our stated 
objectives. OLS (ordinary least square) regressions are considered to study the 
impact of household level social capital, and risk related hardship faced by the 
households of sample villages. A Maximum Likelihood (ML) Logit model is 
considered to examine the important factors that affect households‟ direct 
dependence on forest product in our cross-sectional data of all FPC member 
households in four sample villages. It can be argued that households‟ decision to 
depend on forest is also a labour allocation decision, which is relevant to the 
households‟ production function. Therefore the important factors affecting labour 
allocation decision are their factor endowments such as human capital, household 
assets and other variables, which are related to their preferences to use the forest 
(Sathyapalam, 2005:62). This model has been estimated using econometric 
software called LIMDEP.  
 
Profile of the Sample Villages 
 
All the sample villages fall into the semi-arid agro-climatic category with red 
soils, insufficient rainfall and not good in terms of moisture retention. The socio 
economic profile of the sample villages is presented in Table 1. It shows that all 
households belong to either very poor or poor category in two (Goulber Marshal 
and Amjuri) out of four villages. Out of the remaining villages the incidence of 
very poor and poor category in Kherajhore and Khatgeria works out to about 
93.75 and 70.59 per cent respectively. Although more than two-fifths of the 
households are landless in all FPs/Villages, the incidence of landless households 
is relatively high in Amjuri (73.07 per cent) and Goulbur Marshal (57.62 per 
cent). Moreover, all the households in two (Goulber Marshal and Amjuri) of the 
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four villages belong to ST category and the average size of household members 
in these two FPCs/Villages is relatively high in relation to the rest ones. The 
majority of households in other two villages belong to general category. In fact, 
agriculture and its allied activities are the main source of income of the 
households in our sample villages. A considerable portion of land in each village 
is under wastelands, which are not cultivated. Therefore, dependence on forest 
resources under JFM programme is expected to have a substantial impact on the 
livelihood of most of these households.  
 
Table 1: Socio – Economic Characteristics of the Sample FPCs/Villages 
FPC/ 
Village 
No. of 
HH 
Ave 
rage 
size of 
HH 
Average 
size of Land 
Holding 
(acres) 
HH belonging to Wealth 
Category 
% of H H 
belonging to 
% of FPC member 
Very Poor Poor Medium SC ST Illiterate 
Primary 
Edn. 
Kherajhor
e 
32 4.30 3.25(24) 18[14] 12 2 6.25 3.13 56.25 37.50 
Khatgeria 17 4.68 3.52(18) 7[7] 5 5 - 14.18 58.82 29.41 
Goulber 
Marshal 
59 6.38 2.65(49) 38[34] 21 - - 100 66..10 20.34 
Amjuri 26 6.02 1.35(14) 23[19] 3 - - 100 69..23 26.92 
Total 134 5.60 2.65(32.31) 86[74] 41 7 1.25 73.10 64.17 25.82 
Note: HH=Households. Figures in () indicate percentage of area under Wastelands. Wastelands include private 
as well as common lands that are not being cultivated. Figures in [ ] indicate number of landless labour 
households. 
Very Poor Indicates per capita annual income within the range of Rs.0-8500; Poor implies per capita annual 
income within the range of above Rs.8500-11000; Medium represents per capita annual income within the 
range of above Rs.11000-13000. Both very poor and poor income groups live below poverty line. These 
classifications (very poor, poor and medium) have been taken from Bezbaruah(2004). 
Source: Sample Survey, 2005. 
 
Participatory JFM Programme and Rural Livelihoods 
 
The impact of the JFM programme in the four sample villages we studied 
is measured in terms of changes in various indicators under five capital 
frameworks – Physical, Natural, Human, Social and Financial. 
 
Physical Capital 
 
Forest related structures reflect the physical capital (for example, NTFP based 
production enterprises based on sal leaves, kendu leaves,mohua flower and 
medicinal plants) created at the household and village level based on local forest 
products under JFM programme. As regards changes(%) in the quantity(kg./ 
unit) of NTFP based production in the sample households of this study is 
concerned (Table 2),the quantity of all types of forest based production has 
recorded a significant increase for the JFM programme in sample villages and the 
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rate of increase is more pronounced among the very poor households in all 
sample villages, the rate of increase being the least for the medium categories of 
household in the sample. It suggests that very poor households have benefited 
more by the NTFP based physical capital created at the household and 
FPC/Village level for JFM Programme under our study. 
 
Table 2: Change (%) in the quantity of NTFP based production by NTFP based 
production enterprise of the Sample Households. 
(„000 k.g./unit) 
FPC/ 
Village 
Category of 
HH 
(Wealth) 
NTFP based production enterprise 
Sal Plate Kendu Bidi (local Cigarette) 
Before After 
% Change* 
Before After % Change* 
Kherajhore V. Poor 110 (2.05) 317 (5.94) 118.18* 
(189.76) 
24 
(1.33) 
57 
(3.17) 
137.5* 
(138.34) 
Poor 32 (2.67) 54 (4.50) 68.75* 
(68.54) 
50 
(4.17) 
84 
(7.00) 
68* 
(68) 
Medium 24 (12.00) 30 (15.00) 25* 
(25) 
27 
(13.50) 
35 
(17.50) 
29.63* 
(29.62) 
Khatgeria V. Poor 19 (2.71) 45 (6.43) 136.84* 
(137.27) 
11 
(1.57) 
24 
(3.43) 
118.18* 
(118.47) 
Poor 11 (2.20) 24 (4.80) 118.18* 
(118.18) 
25 
(5.00) 
37 
(7.40) 
48* 
(48) 
Medium 10 (2.00) 18 (3.60) 80.00* 
(80) 
72 
(14.40) 
89 
(17.80) 
23.61* 
(23.61) 
Goulber 
Marshal 
V. Poor 120 (3.16) 266 (7.00) 121.67* 
(121.51) 
57 
(1.50) 
133 
(3.50) 
133.33* 
(133.33) 
Poor 74 (3.52) 126 (6.00) 70.27* 
(70.45) 
107 
(5.10) 
168 
(8.0) 
57.01* 
(56.86) 
Amjuri V. Poor 72 (3.13) 161 (7.00) 123.61* 
(123.64) 
35 
(1.52) 
80 
(3.48) 
128.57* 
(128.94) 
Poor 7 (2.33) 14 (4.66) 100.00* 
(85.83) 
13 
(4.33) 
21 
(7.0) 
61.54* 
(61.66) 
 
FPC/ 
Village 
Category of 
HH 
(Wealth) 
NTFP based production enterprise 
Mohua Flower (Local Wine) Medicine 
Before After % Change* Before After % Change 
Kherajhore V. Poor 12 
(0.67) 
27 
(1.50) 
125* 
(123.88) 
- - - 
Poor 61 
(5.08) 
98 
(8.17) 
60.66* 
(60.82) 
- - - 
Medium 30 
(15.00) 
41 
(20.50) 
36.67* 
(36.67) 
19+ 
(9.50) 
- 100 
(-100) 
Khatgeria V. Poor 4 
(0.57) 
11 
(1.57) 
175* 
(175.43) 
- - - 
Poor 26 
(5.20) 
41 
(8.20) 
57.69* 
(57.69) 
- - - 
Medium 67 
(13.40) 
92 
(18.40) 
33.31* 
(37.31) 
47$ 
(9.40) 
56 
(11.20) 
19.15 
(19.15) 
Goulber 
Marshal 
V. Poor 17 
(0.45) 
37 
(0.97) 
117.65* 
(115.56) 
- - - 
Poor 25 
(5.95) 
169 
(8.05) 
32.20* 
(35.29) 
- - - 
Amjuri V. Poor 14 
(0.61) 
32 
(1.39) 
128.57* 
(127.87) 
- - - 
Poor 19 
(6.33) 
26 
(8.67) 
36.84 
(36.97) 
- - - 
Note: Figures in ( ) indicate average size of livestock unit per household. The change in ( ) is per cent change, 
not absolute. 
* Indicates that the difference is statistically significant at 1 per cent level. The size of household in + is 2,and 
that of $,5. 
Source: Sample Survey, 2005. 
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Natural Capital 
 
Natural capital is a key to livelihood security in agrarian societies. Our main 
focus of the measurement of natural capital in this study is in terms of changes in 
access to fodder, fuelwood, NTFPs and TFPs (Timber Forest Products) that act 
as a flow input into livelihood activities of household as well as community level 
in the study area. This is portrayed in Table 3. 
 Livestock rearing is an important livelihood strategy in the sample 
FPCs/villages. The availability of fodder on a sustainable basis is the key for the 
sustainability of livestock rearing. Table 3 shows that fodder availability has 
made a significant increase in all the sample villages for JFM Programme, the 
rate of increase being more prominent among the households of very poor 
category, and medium category is the least beneficiaries by these shifts. This is 
also true in terms of changes in access to daily fuelwood collection, daily 
collection of NTFPs, which are also a key to the livelihood security for 
households we surveyed. But with regard to the changes in the collection of 
timber forest products (TFPs) per day by the sample households are concerned. 
 
Table 3: Change (%) in the Availability of Fodder (per standard cattle), 
Fuelwood, NTFPs and TFPs by the Sample Households per day from before JFM 
to after JFM situations 
FPC/ 
Village 
Category of 
HH (Wealth) 
% Change** 
(fodder) 
% Change* 
(fuelwood) 
% Change* 
(NTFPs) 
% Change* 
(TFPs) 
 
Kherajhore 
Very Poor 70.83** (2.6) 19.00* (1.05) 226.87* (8.45) -90.77*(-2.78) 
Poor 50.79**(3.2) 9.5* (0.79) 252.94 *(7.17) -75.00*(-1.0) 
Medium 30.33** 4.2) 0.05* (0.03) -100* (-1.0) -100.00*(-2.50) 
 
Khatgeria 
Very Poor 137.74** (5.4) 9.5* (1.36) 172.73 *(8.15) -79.17*(-2.72) 
Poor 47.06** (4.5) 5.5*(1.1) 176.19 *(7.40) -84.62*(-2.20) 
Medium 31.20** (4.4) - 150 *(0.60) -100.00*(2.40) 
oulber 
Marshal 
Very Poor 78.46** (4.8) 15.5*(0.4) 50.57* (2.34) 285.71*(3.15) 
Poor 30.61** (3.2) 9.5*(0.44) 56.10 *(2.20) 84.21*(0.77) 
mjuri 
Very Poor 137.73** 6.6) 26.25*(1.15) 139.76 *(5.04) -66.67*(-0.87) 
Poor 68.29** (4.3) 2.95*(0.98) 200 *(6.0) -60.00*(-1.0) 
Note: Standard livestock is arrived at by converting small livestock on a 3:1 ratio to big livestock. 
Figures () indicate average change per household (in absolute term). * and ** indicate that the difference is 
statistically significant at 1 per cent and 5 per cent level respectively. 
Source: Sample Survey, 2005. 
 
 Table 3 shows that the rate of change of quantity of TFPs (Kg) per day has 
significantly decreased in three FPCs/Villages except one for the execution of 
JFM Programme. This is desirable because law forbids the collection of TFPs by 
the households other than Forest Department/Government. Rather the members 
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of the FPC under JFM Programme are entitled to have a fixed share of TFPs 
(usually 20 to 25 per cent of total income from TFPs) from forest 
department/government. Despite prohibited by law for collection of TFPs, very 
poor and poor households under our sample FPCs/Villages are engaged in illegal 
collection of TFPs
5 
although the quantity of collection has significantly 
decreased in three FPCs/Villages during JFM Programme in relation to the past 
when the programme was not in operation. But, more importantly, the illegal 
collection of TFPs has substantially increased to one out of four FPCs/Villages 
by both very poor and poor categories of households. This is, mainly, because 
the rate of increase of the collection of legal Forest Products (FPs) -like NTFPs,, 
Fuelwood - which are also one of the main sources of livelihood security for very 
poor and poor categories of households, in the particular village (Goulber 
Marshal) by poor and very poor categories of households is substantially lower 
than that of the collection of same type of legal Forest Products by all categories 
of households in other three villages. On the other hand, the illegal collection of 
TFPs by all categories of households in three sample villages out of four have 
considerably decreased instead of an increase that has been made in one 
FPC/Village (Goulbar Marshal) after JFM Programme. At the same time the 
legal collection of Forest Products–Fuelwood and NTFPs–by the same categories 
of households in the three villages except one (Goulbar Marshal) has 
significantly increased after the execution of JFM Programme.It seems to imply 
that law cannot forcibly control the illegal collection of TFPs of the very poor 
and poor categories of households, who are almost dependent on FPs for their 
livelihood security, until and unless they are guaranteed with minimum 
livelihood security by other sources. 
 
Human Capital 
 
As regards direct measurement of human capital is concerned, this study 
considers that changes in education and medical expenditure by the sample 
households might act as a key factor for SRL due to JFM Programme. Table 4 
reveals that medical and educational expenditure has significantly increased for 
JFM Programme in the sample villages. Out of all categories of households the 
rate of increase of medical and educational expenditure is more pronounced for 
the very poor category and the least prominent for medium category in the 
sample FPCs/Villages. This result might indirectly suggests that the money 
income of the very poor category has more increased than others in all sample 
villages for the execution of JFM Programme. However the change of real 
expenditure (Rs), which is determined after deflating the money income by 
Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Labourer (CPIAL), on both medical and 
education variables for households is negative from before to after JFM 
situations. 
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Table 4: Annual Medical and Educational Expenditure of the Sample Households 
during before and after JFM situations (with % change) 
FPC/ Village 
Category of 
HH (Wealth) 
Before JFM(Expenditure/Household/ 
Year in Rs.) 
After 
JFM (Expenditure/Household/ 
Year in Rs.) 
Percentage Change 
Medical 
Education Medical Education 
Medical* 
Education* 
Kherajhore 
Very Poor 
1612[9] 
(89.56) 
2040[11.40] 
(113.33) 
2322 [6.97] 
(129) 
2885 [8.66] 
(160.28) 
44.04* [-22.56] 
(39.44) 
41.42* [-21.03] 
(46.95) 
Poor 
1824[10.19] 
(152.00) 
2658[14.85] 
(221.50) 
2550 [7.66] 
(212.50) 
3857[11.58] 
(321.42) 
39.80* [-24.83] 
(60.50) 
45.11* [-22.02] 
(99.92) 
Medium 
3360[18.77] 
(1680.00) 
6300[35.20] 
(3150.00) 
4385[13.17] 
(2192.50) 
10950[32.88] 
(5475.00) 
30.51*[-29.83] 
(512.50) 
73.81*[-6.59] 
(2325.00) 
Khatgeria 
Very Poor 
1526[8.52] 
(218.00) 
2272[12.69] 
(324.57) 
2478[7.44] 
(354.00) 
3063[9.20] 
(437.57) 
62.39*[-12.68] 
(136.00) 
34.82*[-27.50] 
(113.00) 
Poor 
2068[11.55] 
(413.60) 
2842[15.88] 
(568.40) 
2808[8.43] 
(561.60) 
3956[11.88] 
(791.20) 
35.78*[-27.01] 
(148.00) 
39.20*[-25.19] 
(222.80) 
Medium 
3930[21.96] 
(786.00) 
7450[41.62] 
(1490.00) 
4548[13.66] 
(909.60) 
12780[38.38] 
(2556.00) 
15.73*[-37.80] 
(123.60) 
71.54*[-7.78] 
(1066.00) 
Goulber 
Marshal 
Very Poor 
1570[8.77] 
(41.32) 
1465[8.18] 
(38.55) 
2555[7.67] 
(67.24) 
2084[6.26] 
(54.84) 
62.74*[-12.04] 
(25.93) 
42.25*[-23.47] 
(16.29) 
Poor 
2971[16.60] 
(141.48) 
3490[19.50] 
(166.19) 
3674[11.03] 
(174.95) 
4278[12.85] 
(203.71) 
23.66*[-33.55] 
(33.47) 
22.58*[-34.10] 
(37.52) 
Amjuri 
Very Poor 
1497[8.36] 
(65.09) 
1685[9.41] 
(73.26) 
2724[8.18] 
(118.43) 
2143[6.44] 
(93.17) 
81.96*[-2.15] 
(53.34) 
27.18*[-31.56] 
(19.91) 
Poor 
1628[9.09] 
(542.67) 
2270[12.68] 
(756.67) 
2856[8.58] 
(952.00) 
4138[12.43] 
(1046.00) 
75.43*[-5.61] 
(409.33) 
38.24*[-1.58] 
(289.33) 
Note: * Indicates that the difference in statistically significant at 1 per cent level. Figures in () indicate average 
annual expenditure (Rs.) per household. Figures in [] indicate real expenditure (Rs.).  
Source: Sample Survey, 2005 
 
Social Capital 
 
Concerning to determining factors for creating community level social capital 
among sample households are concerned (Table 5), participatory decision 
making, the presence of FPC members in most of the general meetings of FPCs, 
the receiving of more information
6
related to the activities of JFM Programme by 
the majority of FPC members, equity in benefit flows among all members of 
FPCs are the general phenomena among the households in the sample villages, 
influencing direct positive influence of developing social capital and 
participatory programme at the community level.  
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Table 5: Determinants of Community Level Social Capital among Sample 
Households of Participatory JFM Programme. 
FPC/ 
Village 
Category 
of HH 
(Wealth) 
No. 
of 
HH 
 
Decision making 
And/Or Participation 
Presence in the general meeting 
of JFM Programme (%) 
Households receive 
information related to the 
activities of JFM 
Programme 
Nature of 
distribution of 
timber share 
received from 
Govt. by the 
households 
Decision 
Making 
with 
Participati
-on 
Decision 
Making 
without 
Participati
on 
 
Participati
on 
without 
Decision 
Making 
Below 
25 25-30 51-75 75-99 100 No Less More 
Unequal Equal 
Kheraj
hore 
Very Poor 18 18 - - - - - 2 16 - - 18 - 18 
 Poor 12 12  - - - - - 1 11 - - 12 - 12 
 Medium 02 02 - - - - -  02 - - 02 - 02 
Khatge
ria 
Very Poor 07 06 - 1 01 - - 02 04 - 02 05 - 07 
Poor 05 05 - - - 01 - 01 03 - 01 04 - 05 
Medium 05 05 - - 01 - - 01 03 - 01 04 - 05 
Goulb
ur 
Marsha
l 
Very Poor 38 32 - 6 11 02 03 04 18 - 16 22 - 38 
Poor 21 19 - 2 04 03 - 06 08 - 08 13 - 21 
Amjuri 
Very Poor 23 22 - 1 02 - - 02 19 - 05 18 - 23 
Poor 03 03 - - - - - 01 02 - 1 02 - 03 
Note: „More‟ implies more accurate information relating to JFM programme and its management, market price 
of forest products, forest wage rate etc.  
FPC member households usually receives information from the following sources: forest officials, forest 
executive committee, Panchayet personnel, government deputed agents, market middlemen and media. When 
FPC member households receive more accurate information, they usually have it from government agents and 
media in addition to their four additional sources: forest officials, forest executive committee, Panchayet 
personnel, market middlemen. 
 Source: Sample Survey, 2005 
 
Financial Capital 
 
Improvement to financial capital under SRL framework in the present context is 
assessed in terms of sustainable increase in income potentials because of the 
difficulties in obtaining accurate information on savings for the reluctance of the 
member of households to talk about their savings. As may be seen from Table 6, 
the net annual return (in Rs.) and net annual average household income (in Rs.) 
generated from forest resources for very poor and poor categories of households 
in sample villages have significantly increased due to JFM Programme compared 
with the past when the programme was not in operation. 
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Table 6: Annual Net Households Return (in Rs.) from Forest Sources of Sample 
Per Year during before and after JFM  
 (with %change) 
FPC/ 
Village 
Category of HH 
Before JFM (Rs.) 
NTFPs, Fuelwood Fodder 
Return from 
Timber sale 
Return from 
Timber Share 
Wage 
income 
from forest 
Net Return from all Forest 
source 
Consumption Sale 
Kherajhore 
Very Poor 105120 197100 11859 _ 6324  314079 [1754.63] 
Poor 91980 96360 2913 _ 2175 191253 [1068.45] 
Medium 16060 3650 913 _ - 20623 [115.21] 
Khatgeria 
Very Poor 38325 71540 4382 _ 2728 114247 [638.25] 
Poor 36500 40150 2374 _ 925 79024 [441.47] 
Medium 40150 - 2190 _ - 42340 [236.54] 
Goulbur 
Marshal 
Very Poor 235790 443840 7698 _ 1476 687328 [3839.82] 
Poor 158297 176295 3833 _ 2668 341093 [1905.55] 
Amjuri 
Very Poor 111888 352590 5457 _ 5642 475577 [2656.85] 
Poor 19470 30660 914 _ 240 51284 [286.50] 
 
FPC/ 
Village 
Category of 
HH 
After JFM (Rs.) 
 
 
% Change in net 
return* 
NTFPs, Fuelwood 
Fodder 
Return 
from 
Timber 
sale 
Return 
from 
Timber 
Share 
Wage 
income 
from forest 
Net return from all 
forest source 
Consum
ption 
Sale 
Kherajhor
e 
Very Poor 
124830 315360 39420 6498 31500 517608 [1554.38] 64.80* [-11.41] 
Poor 
100740 157680 17520 4332 13250 293522 [881.44] 53.47* [-17.50] 
Medium 
18250 - - 722 - 18972 [56.97] -8.01* [-50.55] 
Khatgeria 
Very Poor 
48545 114975 12775 5852 13580 195727 [587.77] 71.32* [-7.91] 
Poor 
43800 62050 3650 4180 4185 117865 [353.95] 49.15* [-19.82] 
Medium 
45625 - - 4180 - 49805 [149.56] 17.63* [-40.58] 
Goulbur 
Marshal 
Very Poor 
177400 268670 817650 3724 8320 1275764 [3831.12] 85.61* [-0.23] 
Poor 
191625 222285 229950 2058 13440 659358 [1980.05] 93.31* [-3.90] 
Amjuri 
Very Poor 
142715 562465 100740 - 31280 837200 [2514.11] 76.04* [-5.37] 
Poor 
32995 50180 2190  1260 86625 [260.13] 68.91* [-9.20] 
 
Note: *Indicates that the difference is statistically significant at 1% level; [ ] represents real net return in Rs. 
Source: Sample Survey, 2005. 
  
 On the other hand, the rate of increase in net return (in Rs.) is around 18 per 
cent for medium category of households in one FPC/Village (Khatgeria), 
whereas in Kherajhore FPC/Village this shifts is negative for medium category. 
It might suggest that very poor and poor categories of households are more 
dependent on income from forest resources; but medium category of households 
is more dependent on their income from non-forest sources. It is important to 
mention that the change of real net return (Rs) (determined after deflating the 
money income by Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Labourer, CPIAL) is 
negative for all categories of households from before to after JFM situations. 
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 Turning to the incremental annual net return (in Rs.) of sample households 
from all sources, Table 7 shows that while the JFM Programme is in operation, 
the contribution of net return (in Rs.) from forest sources out of the net return (in 
Rs.) from all sources works out to the major source of income for very poor and 
poor categories of households in all sample villages. Although the change of real 
net return (Rs) from all sources is negative for all categories of households from 
before to after JFM situations, compared with non-forest real income, forest real 
income is less negative for poor and very poor categories of households in all 
villages. It might indirectly imply that real income from forest source is more 
beneficial than non-forest income for poor and very poor categories of 
households in all villages under study after JFM situation. 
 
Table 7: Annual Net Households Revenue from All Sources, pre and post JFM  
FPC/ 
Village 
Category 
HH 
(Wealth) 
Pre JFM Post JFM % Change 
Net Return 
from Forest 
sources  
(Rs.) 
Net Return 
from other 
sources 
Net Return 
from all 
sources 
(Rs.) 
Net Return 
from Forest 
sources  
(Rs.) 
Net Return 
from other 
source    
(Rs.) 
Net Return 
from all 
sources  
(Rs.) 
Net Return 
from 
Forest 
source* 
(Rs.) 
Net Return 
from other 
sources* 
(Rs.) 
Net Return 
from all 
sources* 
(Rs.) 
Kherajhore Very 
Poor 
314079 
(17448.83) 
177427 
(9857.06) 
491506 
{2745.84} 
[63.90] 
517608 
(28756) 
132664 650272 
{1952.77} 
[79.60] 
64.80* -25.23* 32.30* 
{-28.88} 
 Poor 191253 
(15937.75) 
227945 
(18995.42) 
419198 
{2341.89} 
[45.62] 
293522 
(24460.17) 
228773 
(19064.42) 
522295 
{1568.45} 
[56.20] 
53.47* 0.36* 24.59* 
{-33.03} 
 Medium 20623 
(10311.50) 
70216 
(35108) 
90839 
{507.48} 
[22.70] 
18972 
(9486.00) 
86060 
(43030.00) 
105032 
{315.41} 
[18.06] 
-8.01* 22.56* 15.628* 
{-37.85} 
Khatgeria Very 
Poor 
114247 
(16321) 
80383 
(11483.29) 
194630 
{1087.48} 
[58.70] 
195727 
(27961.00) 
14592 
(2084.57) 
210319 
{631.59} 
[93.06] 
71.32* -81.85* 80.61* 
{-41.91} 
 Poor 79024 
(15804.80) 
103776 
(20755.20) 
182800 
{1021.22} 
[43.23] 
117865 
(23573.00) 
97579 
(19515.80) 
215444 
{646.98} 
[54.71] 
49.15* -5.97* 17.86* 
{-36.65} 
 Medium 42340 
(8468) 
186165 
(37233) 
228505 
{1276.56} 
[18.53] 
49805 
(9961.00) 
245597 
(49119.40) 
295402 
{887.09} 
[16.86] 
17.63* 31.92* 29.27* 
{-30.51} 
Goulbur 
Marshal 
Very 
Poor 
687328 
(18087.58) 
430805 
(11336.97) 
1118133 
{6246.55} 
[61.47] 
1275764 
(33572.74) 
252136 
(6635.16) 
1527900 
{4588.29} 
[83.50] 
85.61* -41.47* 36.65* 
{-26.55} 
 Poor 341093 
(16242.52) 
532992 
(25380.52) 
874085 
{4883.16} 
[39.02] 
659358 
(31398.00) 
534940 
(25473.33) 
1194298 
{3586.48} 
[55.21] 
93.30* 0.37* 36.63* 
{-26.55} 
Amjuri Very 
Poor 
475577 
(20677.26) 
293027 
(12740.30) 
768604 
{4293.88} 
[61.88] 
837200 
(36400.00) 
289315 
(12578.91) 
1126515 
{3382.93} 
[74.32] 
76.04* -1.27* 44.67* 
{-21.22} 
 Poor 51284 
(17094.67) 
620114 
(206704.66) 
671398 
{3750.83} 
[7.64] 
86625 
(28875.00) 
70407 
(23469.00) 
157032 
{471.57} 
[55.16] 
68.91* -88.65* -76.61 
{-87.43} 
Note: Figures in () indicate average net return from forest/other sources per household. Figures in [] represent 
percentage net return from forest sources of net return from all sources. * indicates that the difference is 
statistically significant at 1 per cent level. Figures in {} represents real net return (in Rs). 
Source: Sample Survey, 2005. 
 
 The results of maximum likelihood logit model show the effect of some 
important determinants on households‟ direct dependence on forest products 
(Table 8). The dependent variable has been specified as Y=1, if the household 
depends on the forest by collecting forest products, O=Otherwise. It is important 
to mention that all median categories of households do not depend on forest by 
collecting forest products. The measurement scale of EDN (educational level) 
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and family size used in the regression model also appears in the appendix. Based 
on the male and female members of each household female- male ratio (female 
sex ratio) has been calculated. Some other explanatory variables used in this 
regression model are usually quantitative in character.  
 The results of Table 8 reveal that the regression is statistically significant at 
1 per cent level; all the coefficients of explanatory variables are also significant 
and are of expected signs. Households having larger family size, own livestock, 
lower education level, larger female sex ratio and living for a long time nearby 
the forest are more likely to depend on forest resource. It also shows that very 
poor families are more dependent on forest products for their livelihood security. 
The strong sustainability criteria meets for all very poor categories of households 
in all sample villages, because the change of each type of capital is greater than 
zero and the change of their income from non-forest sources is less than zero. 
The strong sustainability criteria also meet for poor categories of households in 
two villages – Amjuria and Khatgeria. But in other two villages – Kherajhore and 
Goulbar Marshal, although the change of income from non-forest for poor 
categories of households is positive, the positive change (0.36 for Kherajhore and 
0.37 for Goulbar Marshal) is very close to zero. So, strong sustainability criteria 
is also likely to satisfy for all poor categories of households in our sample.; but 
for medium category of households the contribution of forest income is not so 
important as the very poor and poor households. Similarly the rate of increase of 
net return (in Rs.) from forest source has considerably increased for very poor 
and poor categories of households in our sample villages after the execution of 
JFM Programme. As may be seen in Table 8, the contribution of forest income is 
more prominent particularly for very poor category, ranging between 75.32 per 
cent and 93.06 per cent of the net income (in Rs.) from all sources in the sample 
villages, while the JFM Programme is in operation. But it is also observed that 
the forest source was the major source of net income (in Rs.) particularly for very 
poor category of households before the execution of JFM Programme when the 
forest was mainly used for commercial purpose and the forest fringe 
communities were not legally allowed to use forest resources for their livelihood 
security (Tables 8 and 9). Nevertheless law could not forcibly control the illegal 
collection of forest products particularly by the very poor and poor categories of 
households because these people are mainly dependent on forest products for 
their livelihood security. Additionally, although the new JFM Programme lays 
emphasis on meeting local needs by supporting them fuelwood, fodder, food, 
NTFPs and limited use of timber for self consumption, it prohibited the free 
collection of timber products by the local people to maintain the carrying 
capacity of the forests. The local people are given a 20-25 per cent of share from 
the sell of timber by the forest department/Government instead of their free 
collection of timber products. But, as discussed earlier, despite prohibited by law 
for the free collection of TFPs, the very poor and poor categories of households 
in one out of four sample villages has made a substantial increase of their 
collection of TFPs after the execution of JFM Programme, mainly, because the 
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rate of increase of their legal collection of forest products-fuel wood and NTFPs 
(Table 3)- are substantially lower than that of the collection of the same type of 
Forest Products by the same categories of households in other three 
FPCs/villages. It clearly seems to indicate that force or law can not effectively 
control the illegal collection of Timber Forest Product (TFPs) of the very poor 
and poor categories of households until and unless a considerable collection of 
legal forest products like fuelwood, NTFPs meet their minimum livelihood 
security. 
 In this connection, it needs mentioning that price per unit of some NTFPs 
like kendu leaves (the most valuable NTFPs per unit in Rs. in the area we 
surveyed), sal seed, the collectors receive from its purchasers is very low in 
relation to their market prices. What is more significant is that whatever amount 
of more valuable NTFPs per unit (in Rs.) the collectors desire to sell in the 
market they have only to sell it legally to the agents of LAMS (Large Adibasi 
Multipurpose Society), which usually pay to their collectors considerably lower 
price per unit. Table 9 shows that net profit per Kg. of kendu leaves for the 
agents of LAMPS is about hundred per cent of the collector‟s price. Similarly, 
net profit per K.G. of sal seeds is more than hundred percent of the collector‟s 
price. This situation is more or less similar with Jharkhand state, very close to 
West Bengal state. In Jharkhand, Jharkhand State Forest Development 
Corporation (JSFDC), licensed traders operating on behalf of the state, controls 
kendu leaves marketing in the state, where villagers are little more than 
collectors operating as pure price takers in a monopsony, with no bargaining 
position and no incentives to improve quality above minimum standards (World 
Bank, 2006: 46). 
 
Table 8: Effects of Household‟s Dependence on Forest: Results of Maximum 
Likelihood Logit Analysis 
Other Variables Coefficient t Values 
Constant 
PCL (land in acres) 
-1.38 1.84** 
LSTOCK [with Livestock=1 
Otherwise=0] 
3.52 4.67* 
HHSIZE (in number) 2.83 5.94* 
PCEXP (in Rupees) -1.58 5.02* 
S RATIO (female male ratio) 0.94 3.83* 
EDN (in years) -1.69 2.54* 
STAY (in years) 2.31 3.92* 
Number of observation=134 
LR 0.01, 7 = 169.34 
Log Likelihood=134.06 
Pseudo Rˇ=0.76 
  
Note: Dependant Variable (Y=1, if Household depends on forest by collecting forest product; O=Otherwise); 
PCL = Per capita availability of land; LSTCOK=Ownership of livestock; HHSIZE=Household size; 
EDN=Educational level; PCEXP=Per capita expenditure; SRATIO=Sex ratio (f/m); STAY=Number of years 
since the household had settled in the area. * and ** indicate that the values of coefficient are significant at 1 
per cent and 5 per cent level of significance respectively. 
Source: Sample Survey, 2005. 
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Table 9: Variation in Price of Some Valuable NTFPs the Collectors‟ sell to the 
Agents of LAMPS Rs. per KG Mid value and range
+
 
Name of 
NTFPs 
 Collectors‟ price Processing, transport and other costs Market price Profit☉ 
Kendu leaves 
Sal seeds 
 20±5 13±4 52±4.50 19±4.50 
 0.75±0.50 1.50±0.70 4.00±0.60 1.75±0.60 
+The method is suggested by Rudra (1992) ☉Column 5 = [ 4 – (2 + 3) ]  
Source: Sample Survey. 
 
 We now examine how far livelihood strategy has been effective among the 
sample households for JFM programme by the linkages of migration (changes in 
the pattern of migration, change in employment and wage structure of 
households). With regard to the changes in the annual migration pattern among 
the sample households, this study (Table 10) reveals that there is a significant 
decrease of seasonal migration of the labour categories of households (very poor 
and poor households), who usually go to other villages/towns when opportunities 
of employment are limited within their own villages/ regions, in all sample 
villages for JFM Programme. It implies that the scope of employment for very 
poor and poor categories of households has significantly increased within their 
own villages for support activities like fuelwood, NTFPs owing to the exclusion 
of JFM Programme, although these shifts are more favorable among very poor 
categories of households. However, higher the employment opportunities within 
the village or lower level of out- migration from the villages are expected to 
develop social network at the FPC/Village level. 
 
Table 10: Pattern of Migration among the Sample Households in a year 
FPC/ 
Village 
 
Category  
HH 
(Wealth) 
Before After % Change 
No. of 
Persons 
No. of 
days 
Distance 
(Km) 
No. of 
Persons 
No. of days Distance 
(Km) 
No. of 
Persons** 
No. of days* 
Kherajhore Very Poor 12 
(0.67) 
685 
(38.06) 
8-300 4 
(0.22) 
90 
(5.0) 
4-50 -66.67** 
(-0.45) 
-86.86* 
(-33.06) 
Poor 05 
(0.42) 
110 
(9.17) 
40-250 1 
(2.08) 
25 
(2.08) 
2-80 -80** 
(-0.34) 
-82.14* 
(-7.09) 
Medium - - - - - - - - 
Khatgeria Very Poor 4 
(0.57) 
192 
(27.43) 
3-240 1 
(0.14) 
15 
(2.14) 
6-40 -75** 
(0.43) 
-92.19* 
(-25.29) 
Poor 2 
(0.40) 
65 
(13.00) 
12-230 - - - -100** 
(-0.40) 
-100* 
(-13.00) 
Medium - - - - - - - - 
Goulber 
Marshal 
Very Poor 36 
(0.95) 
2736 
(72) 
30-250 8 
(0.21) 
224 
(589) 
12-55 -77.78** 
(0.74) 
-91.81* 
(-66.11) 
Poor 16 
(0.76) 
672 
(32) 
30-250 3 
(0.14) 
72 
(3.43) 
10-55 -81.25** 
(0.62) 
-89.29* 
(-28.57) 
Amjuri Very Poor 20 
(0.87) 
1020 
(44.35) 
12-100 5 
(0.22) 
115 
(5.00) 
5-50 -75** 
(0.65) 
-88.73* 
(-39.35) 
Poor 02 
(0.67) 
70 
(23.33) 
8-50 - - - -100** 
(0.67) 
-100* 
(23.33) 
Note: Figures in () indicate average number of persons/days per household annually.* and ** indicate that the 
differences are statistically significant at 1 per cent and 5 per cent level of significance respectively. 
Source: Sample Survey. 
 
 However some important features emerge from this study related to SRL 
framework in all sample villages: First, almost all households, poor and very 
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poor in this study, are dependent on forest resource as the major source of 
livelihood security. The major source of the very poor category of people was the 
forest resource before the joint forest management programme, although their 
forest income has considerably increased after joint forest management 
programme. About 75 percent or more net income of very poor category in each 
of the sample village come from forest source after the JFM Programme. 
Second, there are two sources of income from forest resource – legal source that 
yields from legal collection of NTFPs, fuelwood etc. and the illegal source of 
income, which comes from the collection of TFPs. The major forest income of 
the very poor and poor categories of people comes from forest product other than 
wage income from forest source before and after joint forest management 
programme. Before JFM Programme, almost all forest income for the poor and 
very poor categories of people were illegal; after JFM Programme, the illegal 
income from forest resource has considerably been decreased. But, most 
importantly, the results also show that force or law can not control the illegal 
collection of Timber Forest Product (TFPs) of the very poor and poor categories 
of households until and unless a considerable collection of legal forest products 
like fuelwood, NTFPs meet their minimum livelihood security. Third, the price 
per unit of valuable NTFPs the collectors receive from the agents of LAMPs is 
very low in relation to market price  
 
Policy Model 
 
What are the means to overcome this situation if alternative sources of income 
other than forest resource are limited particularly for very poor categories of 
households? There seems to be two ways to tackle the situation – one is to 
increase the production of NTFPs, fuelwood etc so that the very poor households 
may increase their legal collection of those products; the other is to increase the 
collector‟s price per unit of those FPs they legally collect and sell to the agents of 
LAMPs. But the production of forest products (like NTFPs) the very poor 
households legally collect from forest does not usually increase within the very 
short period; the alternative source to increase the income of the very poor 
households is to increase the price per unit of FPs the very poor households can 
legally sell in the market. The following simple mathematical model is an 
attempt to analyze this issue. 
 
 We assume Ui = U(Z1, Z2)                                            … (1) 
 Where,  Z1  YL Z2  YI 
 Then   Ui = U(YL, YI)                                                         … (2) 
 
 Z1= Commodity (like NTFPs, fuelwood, wage labour on forest related 
service) that yields legal income (YL) from forest resource. 
 Z2= Commodity (like TFPs) that yields illegal income (YI) from forest 
resource. 
 24 
 i = Employed individual i of very poor households. 
 YI is risky and punishable offence for the members of a household if 
legal authority takes action against the criminal. But its implications seem to be 
insignificant for the individuals of very poor category of households because YI 
including YL,which would yield illegal income for all i before JFM 
Programme,was the major source of livelihood security for the same before JFM 
Programme ; moreover after JFM Programme YI is the major source of the 
livelihood security for all i in one FPC (Goulbur Marshall), where legal source of 
income from forest products is very low in relation to the employed individuals 
of very poor category of households in other villages (Tables 3 and 8).So it is 
assumed that U(YL, YI) is continuous and have first and second order partial 
derivatives; it is regular strictly quasi-concave function. The rate of substitution 
of YL for YI is 
 
   
2
1
1 f
f
dy
dyL  
 
 Let us also assume that individual i sell the legal forest commodities (eg. 
NTFPs) they collect from the forest to the agents of LAMPs at p (price per unit 
of legal forest products). It is also assumed that the amount of legal work 
performed by the household i is WL and the legal wage rate r (hourly wage of 
each individual is also equal to all individuals of all very poor households). As 
almost all forest income (in Rs.) for all individuals come from NTFPs, fuelwood 
etc. other than wage income from forest resource, only p is taken into account. 
However, if r is taken into consideration,the change of r is zero, because wage 
rate for forest wage labour is fixed at Rs. 67.50, which is about a double of the 
average local wage rate, for usually eight hours of service from 8am to 4pm.The 
number of working days as wage labour under forest department by the poor 
forest fringe communities are more or less fixed. Usually, one person from each 
poor household gets the opportunity of forest work from 30-40 days per year.  
 By definition 
  YI = TF - WL                                 … (3) 
 Where TF is the total amount of available time for forest works by 
individual i.  
 The budget constraint is  
  YL = rWL                                 … (4) 
 Substituting (3) and (4) into (2) 
 Ui = U(TF- WL, rWL)                                 … (5) 
 In order to maximise utility, we set the derivative of (5) with respect to 
WL equal to zero. The usual first order condition states that the rate of 
substitution of YL for YI is equal to the wage rate  
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 The second order condition is satisfied provided that it is negative. 
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 Equation (5a) is a relation in terms of WL and r and is based on the 
individual i‟s optimizing behavior particularly for very poor categories of 
households. (5a) is the consumer‟s supply curve for legal work which states how 
much individual i will legally work at various wage rates. (5a) is also indirectly 
the consumer‟s demand curve for legal income as the supply of legal work is 
equivalent to the demand for legal income from forest resource. We also assume 
that YI is a normal good. This might be true because the income effect of YI is 
positive for individuals of very poor categories of households (Table 9). Then 
hours in legal forest work will increase with the wage rate, i.e., 
dr
dwL  is positive. 
The higher wage rate (or higher per unit price for legal forest products like 
NTFPs) will induce the individual i to reduce his illegal work time of forest 
related work (like collection of TFPs) and so reduces YI (Fig.1) so long as 
individual i‟s economic condition does not improve. So, the positive relationship 
between WL and r and the consequent reduction of YI will continue till the point 
P3 (Fig1). After P3 the wage rate (or price) makes individual i so well off that he is 
induced to cut down legal working time WL (i.e. increase the YI time) and earn a 
higher income. But this condition implies a better economic condition (or 
upward mobility) of very poor categories of individuals. Practically, when the 
individual will be well off, he will also have more opportunities to increase his 
income other than forest source. Out study also clearly suggests that more well 
off individuals are less dependent on income from forest resources (Tables 8 and 
9).  
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Conclusions  
 
The results that emerge from our study suggest that almost all members, 
including women members in female FPC, actively take decision and participate 
in the JFM programme and almost all households, which belong to very poor and 
poor categories that live below poverty line and mainly depend on forest resource 
for their livelihood security, in all villages enjoy the maximum benefit from 
forest for the execution of JFM programme; moreover there is an equity in 
benefit flows for legal timber income. It implies that the JFM programme under 
the FPCs/Villages we surveyed is participatory. With regard to the SRL 
framework is concerned, it is argued that JFM Programme would sustain rural 
livelihoods if it meets strong sustainability criteria. Our results also suggest that 
strong sustainability criteria meet for all very poor and poor categories of 
households, who live below poverty line and that are almost dependent on forest 
resource for their livelihood security in all FPC/Villages, because the change of 
each type of capital is greater than zero and the change of income from non-
forest sources is less than zero or very near zero.  
 But the change in the free collection of TFPs by the very poor and poor 
households is negative in the three FPCs/Villages, whereas this shift is 
considerably positive in one FPC/Village (Goulbar Marshal). Although the 
positive change of the collection of timber products by the households below 
poverty line is of help in generating their higher current income, the illegal 
collection of timber products from forest produces adverse effect on the 
sustainability of forest resource. But, in fact, the sustainability of forest resource 
is the pre-condition for the SRL based on forest resource.  
P4 
P2
3 
P1 
P3 
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 The JFM Programme based on the National Forest Policy of 1988 in India 
lays emphasis on meeting local needs by supporting them fuelwood, fodder, 
food, NTFPs and limited use of TFPs for self consumption, prohibiting the free 
collection of TFPs by the local people to maintain the carrying capacity of forest. 
Instead of free collection of TFPs by the local people, they are given a 25 per 
cent of share from the sell of timber by the forest department/government. But 
despite forbidden by law regarding the free collection of TFPs, the very poor and 
poor categories of households in one FPC/Village have substantially increased 
their collection of TFPs after JFM Programme, mainly, because the other source 
of forest income –legal collection of NTFPs, fuelwood etc. – is substantially low 
for them in relation to the same categories of households in other three 
FPCs/Villages. Clearly, it implies that force or law cannot effectively control the 
illegal collection of TFPs for the households living below poverty line, which 
mainly dependent on forest resource for livelihood security, until and unless a 
considerable increase in the collection of legal forest products – NTFPs, 
fuelwood etc. – and wage income from forest meets their minimum livelihood 
security. This study also suggests that the price per unit of valuable NTFPs the 
collectors have to sell to the agents of LAMPs is considerably low in relation to 
its market price. 
 What are the policy prescriptions in order to overcome this situation? This 
study suggests that the considerable portion of households is dependent on forest 
resources for their livelihood security and live below poverty line. So, the policy 
prescription of the JFM Programme would be such that those poor categories of 
people can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or 
enhance the capabilities of livelihood and assets both now and in the future, 
while not undermining the natural resource base. Within the existing JFM 
Programme based on the existing field study there seems to be two ways to 
tackle these problems – one is to increase the production of NTFPs, fuelwood 
etc. in order that the very poor households may increase the legal collection of 
those products; but this depends on the participatory forest management 
programme and its proper execution which is often long term in nature. The other 
is to increase the per unit price of Forest Products (FPs) the collectors have to 
sell to the agents of LAMS. In order to execute the programme, Government 
should restrict the power of the LAMPs so that the collectors of Forest Products 
may sell their collection at the market and increase their income from the sell of 
Forest Products However, such an increase in income for the households below 
poverty line is a short term process; it may not increase considerable income for 
them in the long run because the change of real income for all sources are 
negative from before to after JFM situations for all categories of households 
including households belonging to below poverty line. Together with it, more 
pro-poor programmes under both Government and non-Government initiatives 
that complement the benefit of JFM Programme need to be introduced to bring 
about a positive change of the real net income particularly for poor categories of 
households.  
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 [The financial help for this paper has been taken from my UGC project 
entitled „How to execute the Joint Forest Management Programme with 
Sustainability: A study of Joint FPC and Female FPC in four divisions under 
Midnapore and Bankura Districts in West Bengal‟. The usual disclaimers apply.] 
 
Notes 
 
1. Kenneth Arrow (1999) argues that social capital shares the temporal aspect of physical capital but does not 
require material sacrifice (cited in Sobel, 2002: 144). 
 
2. For details, see Mathai and Rathie, 1977: 12. 
 
3. Singh et.al. (2002) establish their inferences on the basis of 97 farmers, the distribution of small, medium and 
large being 16,30and 51 respectively.Jayasankar and Muraleedharan (2000) make the vsalidity of their 
conclusions only on 37 observations, the number of small, medium and large being 12, 15 and 10. 
Banik(1994)proved the validity of the cnclusions of his study on 99 farmers, the number of small and large 
farmers being 74 and 25 respectively. Sharma et.al. (1995) establish the validity of allocative efficiency on 75 
households in the irrigated villages, the small and large landholding households being 64 and 11 respectively, 
and 75 households in the unirrigated villages, the number of small and large being 63 and 12 respectively. 
Rajasekharan and Krishnamoorty(1999) calculated technical efficiency of production on the basis of only 35 
farms. 
 
4. Real earning (in Rs.) is determined after deflating the money income by Consumer Price Index for 
Agricultural Labourer (CPIAL). Indian Labour Burro provides Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Labourer 
[General]. From Indian Labour Journal (1991, 2005) we get CPIAL from 1990-91 to 1995-96 with base year 
1960-61 and from 1995-96 to 2005-06 with base year 1986-87. Now we apply base transformation procedure 
(splicing) for a single base year (1986-87). However the CPIAL during after JFM situation is estimated as 333 
and during before JFM situation is estimated as 179.  
 
5. Never did the respondents say that their source of income is illegal; rather while examining the answer from 
the respondents regarding their break up of their source of income, the distinction between legal and illegal 
source was clearly demarcated.  
 
6. FPC member households usually receives information from the following sources: forest officials, forest 
executive committee, Panchayet personnel, government deputed agents, market middlemen and media. When 
FPC member households receive more accurate information, they usually have it from government agents and 
media in addition to their four additional sources: forest officials, forest executive committee, Panchayet 
personnel, market middlemen. 
 
7. Participatory Rural Appraisal sessions like group discussions, social mapping, resource mapping, wealth 
ranking held among all households under 4 sample FPCs provide the basis for estimation of social capital, but 
data were collected from all individual members of the respective FPCs through the structured questionnaire. 
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